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Hebert: Court Control over Jury Verdicts
NOTES AND COMMENT
by virtue of Section 67 sub a(1) making liens by legal proceedings within four months of the petition null and void, with the
exception that the court may on due notice order any such lien
to be preserved for the benefit of the estate under Section 67 sub
a(3). But Section 6 provides that the Bankruptcy Act shall not
affect the allowance to bankrupts of exemptions prescribed by
state laws in force at the time of filing the petition wherein the
debtor was domiciled over the longer part of the preceding six
months.
Thus, where there is in sequence attachment, homestead filed,
and subsequent bankruptcy, Montana lawyers would do well to
look to the Meyers and California decisions and fit them to the
doctrine of the Wall case. Otherwise, it is submitted that the
doctrine of White v. Stump would require a holding that the
homestead declarant must record by declaration prior to the date
of the bankruptcy petition else the title of the bankruptcy trustee
would be superior by operation of the Bankruptcy Act as related
to local Montana law.
ROBT. M. HOLTER
COURT CONTROL OVER JURY VERDICTS
When, if ever, may a jury be overruled, assuming it has
rendered a verdict on a material issue of fact, has long presented
a problem in our system of trial by jury.
As noted in Scott's Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions
at Law, from the beginning of the thirteenth century until about
the nineteenth century a procedure was followed that where a
verdict was false in fact, that is against the evidence, it could be
set aside by attaint. Thereafter, a new jury could be summoned
and if, upon consideration of the issues tried by the original
jury, it found the verdict to be false, the verdict would be reversed. After which, the original jury would be harshly punished. The verdict would not be reversed if it had support either
by evidence introduced or by facts not in evidence; the reason
being that during this period of history the jurors were allowed
to decide a fact considering both their own personal knowledge
of the circumstances and the evidence introduced. This advice
of controlling juries was used in this country until more modern
and effective methods of control were developed.! Thus, it is apparent that there has long been a difficult struggle in an attempt
to prevent jurors from rendering unreasonable verdicts.
In the year 1655, as reported in Woody v. Guston,' the power
1

Scott, Fundamentalsof Procedurein Actions at Law, 91-91.
'Style, 466; 82 Eng. Reprints, 867.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1954

1

Montana Law Review, Vol. 15 [1954], Iss. 1, Art. 10
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
to order a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against
the evidence was recognized in the court. This remedy was
found by simply extending their ancient jurisdiction of granting
new trials under circumstances of misconduct.8 If the verdict
was against the evidence or the damages awarded were inadequate
or excessive, these were considered suitable grounds for the granting of a new trial.'
The practice developed early in this country of nonsuiting
the plaintiff in those cases where he failed to prove his case. Nonsuiting was generally the name given to a judgment rendered
against the plaintiff when he was unable to prove his case, or
when he refused or neglected to proceed to the trial of a cause
after it had been placed in issue, without determining this issue.'
The term "nonsuit" has been broadly applied to a variety of
terminations of actions which do not adjudicate the issues on the
merits.'
The meaning or definition given to the term nonsuit has been
extended considerably in Montana by the case of McKay v. Montana Union Railway Company In that case a judgment was entered upon a verdict which was directed for defendant upon a
motion at the close of the introduction of both the plaintiff's and
the defendant's testimony, upon the ground of want of sufficient
proof on the part of the plaintiff to support the material allegations of his complaint. This was treated as a judgment of nonsuit
and was reviewed as such on appeal. Upon review, all facts will
be considered which the evidence tends to prove
It is clear that a judgment of nonsuit is not a judgment on
the merits. McCulloch v. Horton,' decided by Mr. Justice Anderson in 1936, states (p. 147) :
"We have said a judgment of nonsuit is not a judgment
on the merits, and nothing short of a judgment on the
merits can prevent a new action. (Arnold v. Genzberger, 96 Mont. 358, 31 P. (2d) 296; Bennetts v. Silver Bow
Amusement Co., 65 Mont. 340, 211 Pac. 336; Glass v.
Basin and Bay State Min. Co., 35 Mont. 567, 90 Pac. 753,
755.)"
The traditional view of a directed verdict was that such a
'Thayer, Evidence, 169.
'Scott, op. cit.

5Wyckoff v. Bradley, 172 A. 790, 113 N.J. Law 104; Cooper v. Crosco,
161 S.E. 310, 201 N. C. 739.
'18 C. J. p. 1147, Note 23; Mcolgan v. Jones, Hubbardand Donnell, 78 P.
(2) 1010, 11 Cal. (2d) 243.
'13 Mont. 15; 31 Pac. 999.

'Herbert v. King, 1 Mont. 475.
'102 Mont. 135, 56 P. (2d) 1344.
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verdict decided the case upon the merits. In the decision of In Re
0
Sharon's Estate,"
the appellant contended that a decision upon a
directed verdict was not a decision upon the merits, but the
equivalent of a nonsuit, and did not bar a subsequent proceeding
by him for the same relief. The court, however, stated that the
law was well settled to the contrary and that a verdict directed
by the court is a decision upon the merits of the case.
R. C. M., 1947, Section 93-4705' specifies those instances
when an action may be dismissed or a judgment of nonsuit entered. Immediately following, Section 93-4706 states:
"In every case other than those mentioned in the last
section, judgment must be rendered on the merits."
Section 93-4706 would appear to be complete and very broad
in its scope; however, it must be read in the light of Section
93-4708 before its full meaning becomes clear. Section 93-4708
reads as follows:
"A final judgment dismissing the complaint, either before or after a trial, does not prevent a new action from
the same cause of action, unless it expressly declares, or
it appears by the judgment-roll, that it is rendered upon
its merits."
In Glass v. Basin and Bay State Min.Co., the court, through
Mr. Chief Justice Brantly (p. 95), points out that Section 93-4708
means that judgments of dismissal, whether enumerated in Section 93-4705 or not, shall not be a bar to another action upon the
same cause of action, unless rendered on the merits, which fact
must be expressly declared upon the face of the judgment or appear from the judgment-roll.
Dunseth v. Butte Electric Ry.Co.,' decides that in Montana
a judgment on a directed verdict may or may not be a judgment
on the merits depending upon the questions decided by the court
and the scope of the ruling. The plaintiff brought an action in
the federal courts against a street-railway company to recover
damages for personal injuries, and the judgment in that court
recited that, after the impaneling of a jury, evidence was submitted by both parties, and at its conclusion a verdict was di10177 Pac. 283, 289; 179 Cal. 447.

"R. C. M., 1947, Section 93-4705. (1937) "Action may be dismissed or
nonsuit entered. An action may be dismissed or a Judgment of nonsuit
entered in the following cases:
5. By the court, upon motion of the defendant, when, upon the
trial, the plaintiff fails to prove a sufficient case for the Jury;
. . . . .
"'34Mont. 88; 85 Pac. 746.
"41 Mont.14; 108 Pac. 567.
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rected in favor of defendant, and plaintiff subsequently instituted suit in the state court on the same cause of action against
the same defendant, the judgment in the federal court was upon
the merits, and a bar to the action in the state court.
Thus, it is apparent that a directed verdict may be on the
merits but only if it complies with Section 93-4708.
Having briefly discussed the nature and effect of a nonsuit
and a directed verdict, we are presented with the important
problem of determining under what circumstances the judge may
1ithdraw the case from the jury and direct a verdict on the
merits.
As the recognized function of the jury became one of deciding issues of fact upon the basis of evidence produced in open
court as distinct from facts which they had personal knowledge of
at that time, it logically followed that where the party bearing
the burden of proof had introduced no evidence, a jury could
not decide in his favor." Therefore, if the party having the
burden of proof, the proponent, as Professor Wigmore calls him,
has offered no proof a directed verdict would be in order. As
has been suggested, Syderbottom v. Smith' was probably the first
case of a directed verdict on this grounds.1
The U.S.S.C. in Parks v. Rose,' states (p. 372):
"It is undoubtedly the peculiar province of the jury to
find all matters of fact, and of the court to decide all
questions of law arising thereon. But a jury has no'
right to assume the truth of any material fact, without
some evidence legally sufficient to establish it. It is,
therefore, error in the court to instruct the jury that
they may find a material fact, of which there is no evidence from which it may be legally inferred."
In 1856 we find the U.S.S.C. saying that where there is
"some evidence" tending to establish a fact in issue, the jury
must judge of its sufficiency after having received proper instructions from the court."
Thus, it developed that in cases where there was a 'scintilla"
of evidence in support of the case, the judge was bound to leave it
to the jury. This rule was early discarded for a more reasonable
and workable rule. As early as 1857, we find the English Court
in Toomey v. London Ry. Co.' stating:
"Smith, The Power of the Judge to Direct a Verdict, 24 Columbia Law
Rev. 113.
'1 Strange 649, 93 Eng. Reprints 759.
"Smith, op. cit.
711 How 362.
"Thoma8 Richardaonv. The City of Bo8ton, 19 How. 263, 269.
'140 Eng. Reprints 694, 696.
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"A scintilla of evidence, or a mere surmise that there
may have been negligence on the part of the defendants,
clearly would not justify the judge in leaving the case
to the jury: there must be evidence upon which they
might reasonably and properly conclude that there was
negligence. "
This rule was adopted by the U. S. S. C. in Improvement
Company v. Munson' in 1871, wherein the court points out that
before the judge is permitted to give the evidence to the jury he
is required to ask himself whether there is any evidence upon
which the jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the
proponent, that is, for the party charged with the burden of
proof. The court further specifies that the question for the
judge is not one of determining whether there is literally no evidence.
R. C. M. of 1947, Section 93-5205, states:
"Where, upon the trial of an issue by a jury, the case
presents only questions of law the judge may direct the
jury to render a verdict in favor of the party entitled
thereto. "
This section codifies what is now a well recognized rule of
law, to which reference was made previously. The difficult query
arises, however, in determining how far beyond this statement
of the law the power of the judge extends.
Early in the Montana Cases there is obiter to the effect that
there must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence to justify a
verdict, or it will not be permitted to stand.'
In 1912 Mr. Chief Justice Brantly and Mr. Justice Smith,
concurring with the majority of the court in the case of Tudor v.
Northern Pacific Ry. Co." (p. 462), state:
"By a process of elimination, counsel for the plaintiff
seek to draw the inference that it must have been the
brakeman who caused the plaintiff's fall; but the circumstances from which the inference is sought to be
drawn are so intangible that at best they produce nothing more than a bare scintilla of evidence, and that is not
sufficient to support a judgment."
The better and more modern rule is stated by Mr. Chief Justice Brantly in Milwaukee Land Co. v. Ruesink, et at (p. 498):
"If a case is being tried to a jury and the evidence is
214 Wall 442, 448.
2

'Pierce v. Great Fall8 and Canada Railway Co., 22 Mont. 445, 448; 56
Pac. 867.
"45 Mont. 456; 124 Pac. 276.
"50 Mont. 489; 148 Pac. 806.
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such that reasonable men can come to but one conclusion
thereon, the court may, as the case requires, direct a
verdict for the party entitled to it, or withdraw the case
from the jury and render judgment."
In 1945 Mr. Justice Cheadle quotes the above statement of
the law with approval in the case of Eric v. Wahl, State Liquor
Control Administrator' (p. 522, 523).
It is pointed out that there must be more than a mere scintilla
of evidence in order to justify a verdict, there must be substantial
evidence in Escallier v. Great Northern Ry. Co.'
From these cases it appears to be certain that Montana has
fully adopted the modern rule that a verdict may be directed
against the party having the burden of proof if, on the evidence
adduced, the jury could "reasonably" declare the facts to be
proved which are necessary to establish his case.
Upon appeal from an order directing a verdict for defendant, the supreme court will consider only the evidence of the
plaintiff, excluding a bare scintilla, but including all fair inferences which may be drawn from the facts proved. Furthermore,
any evidence which is introduced by the defendant which tends
to support the plaintiff's case will be considered. If all this evidence viewed in its most favorable light tends to establish the
case made by plaintiff's pleadings, the order of the lower court
will be reversed.'
Having determined what test is to be applied when the judge
withdraws a case from the jury and directs a verdict, it becomes
necessary to query a bit further and determine whether or not the
same rule should be applied where direction of verdict is attempted and where a verdict is to be set aside as being against the
evidence.
The N. Y. court, in McDonald v. Metropolitan Street Ry.
Co.,' takes the view that there should not be a single rule applied
where the above problem presents itself. States Justice Martin
(pp. 282, 283):
"The rule that a verdict may be directed whenever the
proof is such that a decision to the contrary might be set
aside as against the weight of evidence would be both uncertain and elusive. There is no standard by which to
determine when a verdict may be thus set aside. It depends upon the discretion of the court. The result of
setting aside a verdict and the result of directing one are
2116 Mont. 515; 155 Pac. (2d) 201.
'46 Mont. 238; 127 Pac. 458.
2John8on v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 71 Mont. 390, 304; 23 Pac. 52.
'60 N. E. 282; 167 N. Y. 66,1901.
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widely different, and should not be controlled by the
same conditions as circumstances. In one case there is a
retrial in the other the judgment is final. One rests in
discretion; the other upon legal right. One involves a
mere matter of remedy or procedure; the other determines substantive and substantial rights. Such a rule
would have no just principal upon which to rest."
The Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of MePeck v. Central Vt. R. C.,' takes quite the contrary view (p. 591) :
"As was said by us in DeLaries v. Whitney, 11 C. C. A.
355, 361, 63 Fed. 611, 617: 'When a verdict in one direction ought to be set aside as against the weight of evidence, then, under the rule as now understood, the court
ought to direct a verdict in the other direction.' The
time has gone by when the federal courts sit, at their
own loss of time, and at the expense of the parties, to
take verdicts which they can foresee ought not to be
taken. "
Montana cases show that, where a court is required to set a
verdict for proponent aside because of lack of evidence, it follows
that the court's action would be correct to direct a verdict in
favor of the opposite party.
Mr. Chief Justice Brantly, speaking for the court in Bean v.
Missoula Lumber Co.,. states at page 37:
"But when the evidence is clear and satisfactory, and of
such a character that, if it should be submitted to the
jury and a verdict be rendered contrary to it, the court
would be required to set the verdict aside, then the court
may direct a verdict."
Again, Mr. Chief Justice Brantly, in Escattier v. Great
Northern By. Co.,' states (p. 251) :
"This rule obtains where the evidence is in such a condition that, if the case should be submitted to the jury
and a verdict for the plaintiff returned, it would be the
duty of the court to set it aside."
In 1945 Mr. Justice Cheadle, delivering the opinion of the
court in Eric v. Wahl, State Liquor Control Administrator" (p.
523), reasons:
"It is our view that, had this cause of action been submitted to the jury resulting in a verdict in plaintiff's
"79 Fed. 570.
240
Mont.footnote
31; 10424.
Pac. 869.
OSupra,
uSupra, footnote 28.
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favor, the court would have been required to set such
verdict aside. It follows that the court's action in directing a verdict for defendants was correct."
From these decisions it is clear that Montana judges may
exercise considerable authority in keeping the jury within the
bounds of reasonableness. Presume that at the trial a motion is
made for a directed verdict or for a compulsory nonsuit, and the
district court erroneously refuses to grant the motion and a verdict is rendered against the party who made the motion; what
will the remedy be ? At the common law an appellate court could
not reverse the judgment and enter final judgment dismissing
the complaint. The only action to be taken by the appellate court
was to grant a new trial. Would it not be better to allow the appellate court or the supreme court of Montana to enter judgment
in favor of the party for whom the verdict should have been
rendered, or would this practice be unconstitutional? The U. S.
S. C., in Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., held that this power
to reverse and render final judgments did not exist in the federal
appellate courts and for such action to be taken would violate the
Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution.'
There has been a great deal of criticism of this decision."
What can be the objection of doing after the trial what should
have been done at the trial? There is not an encroachment upon
the province of the jury. The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not guarantee a trial by jury
in a civil action in a state court, and so far as this amendment is
concerned, the states are left to regulate trials in their own courts
in their own way.' Of course, under Section 23 of Article III of
our State Constitution, trial by jury in a civil suit in the state
courts is guaranteed; however, for the supreme court to direct a
verdict in a proper case does not deny this. Under R. C. M.,
1947, Section 93-216 (8805), the powers and duties of the supreme court on appeal are designated. The applicable portion
of this section reads as follows:
"The supreme court may affirm, reverse, or modify any
judgment or order appealed from, and may direct the
2228 U. S.364; 33 Sup. Ct. 523.
"'The Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution states:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law."
"Thorndike, Trial by Jury in United States Courts, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 732;
Thayer, Judicial Administration,63 U. Pa. L. Rev. 585.
"Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 92; 23 L. Ed. 679.
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proper judgment or order to be entered, or direct a new
trial or further proceeding to be had."
In the case ofState ex rel LaFrance Copper Co. v. District
Court," the court considers this problem for the first time. At the
close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant interposed a motion
for a nonsuit, the motion was denied. The plaintiff had verdict
and judgment. The defendant made a motion for a new trial,
which was overruled, thereupon being appealed to the supreme
court. A motion for a nonsuit is considered to be one of law."
The supreme court states:
"We conclude, therefore, that no general rule may be
laid down to determine when this court will, upon deciding that a plaintiff should have been nonsuited, order his
action to be dismissed. This court undoubtedly has the
power, in all proper cases, to make such an order; and in
future the authority will be exercised, when the parties
have one fair opportunity to try the issue before them."
The court continues:
"When a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed for error in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant,
after the former has had full opportunity to introduce
all of his evidence, and it appears that his case is not
supplemented by the defendant, we apprehend that, even
in actions at law, the instances must be rare in which this
court will hereafter feel justified in refusing to make a
final disposition of the cause. And, on like principle,
the court will not hesitate to order a judgment for the
plaintiff when the defendant's case, as made in the court
below, no prejudicial error having been committed
against him, shows that he has no defense to the action."
Thus, the supreme court under the circumstances will dismiss the cause with a view to putting an end to litigation.
In Gregory v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.,'
where the plaintiff in a personal injury suit had full opportunity
to prove his cause but failed, and the evidence introduced by the
defendant did not strengthen or supplement his proof, the supreme court did not direct a new trial, but made such disposition of the case as would finally dispose of the case.
Again, in Wertz v. Lamb, the court points out (p. 484):
"In actions at law, where plaintiff should have been
non-suitei or a directed verdict for defendant should
040
Mont. 206; 105 Pac. 721.
7

' Emer8on v. Eldorado Ditch Co., 18 Mont. 247; 44 Pac. 969.

"42 Mont. 551; 113 Pac. 1123.
"43 Mont. 477; 117 Pac. 89.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1954

9

Montana Law Review, Vol. 15 [1954], Iss. 1, Art. 10
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
have been ordered, and the proper motion was made and
denied, the court will generally direct final disposition
of the cause. (State ex rel La France Copper Co. v. District Court, 40 Mont. 206, 105 Pac. 721.)"
It may be concluded, therefore, that in cases at law where
the parties to the suit have had one fair opportunity to try the
issues in conflict and the question of whether the plaintiff should
have been nonsuited is appealed, the supreme court may clearly
take such action as will finally dispose of the cause of action.
The further problem presents itself of what circumstances
must exist before an appellate court or the supreme court will review the amount of damages awarded? Will a new trial be
granted, or will the court remit or increase the amount of damages awarded?
Even before our constitution was framed, the granting of
new trials outright had become an ingrained part of the English
system of jury trials. Thus, we find the courts saying that such
action on the part of courts does not offend the constitutional
guaranties of trials by jury. Montana has taken such a view,
pointing out that not only does the statute enumerate various
grounds upon which the trial court may set aside a verdict and
grant a new trial, but also adopting the common law rule which
authorized the court, in cases where a motion for a new trial was
made, to order that a new trial be had unless the plaintiff elects
to remit a certain part of the verdict and that, if he does so remit,
judgment will be entered for the rest.'
It is certain today that neither the trial judge nor the appellate court may order straight out the reduction or increase of
the amount of damages returned in a verdict, even though the
English judges did it in early times."
If an award of damages made by a jury is so excessive as to
furnish ground for a new trial, the trial judge or the appellate
court may in the federal courts and in many of the state jurisdictions make an order that a new trial be had, unless the plaintiff will file a remittitur releasing the excess." In Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Herbert," the supreme court of the United
States ruled that vesting discretion in the trial judge to order a
remittitur as an alternative to a new trial does not violate the
right of a trial by jury.
"OBull v. Butte Electric Railway Co., 69 Mont. 529, p. 532; 223 Pac. 514.
"'McCormick, Damages, 78.
"McCormick, op. cit. 76.
"8116 U.S. 642; 29 L. Ed. 755; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458.
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Montana courts have held in Bull v. Butte Electric Railway
Co."
"If the award of damages is so excessive as to lead to the
conclusion that passion and prejudice have influenced
the jury, and the circumstances disclosed are such as to
indicate fairly that the jury was influenced by the same
passion and prejudice in determining the other issues, a
new trial should be granted absolutely as was done in
Chenoweth v. Great Northern Ry. Co., above. But,
where it is made to appear that the successful party is
clearly entitled to recover some substantial amount, and
that, if passion and prejudice have entered into the
jury's determination at all, they have gone no further
than to swell the amount, the rule may be applied and
the excess remitted as a condition to denying a motion
for a new trial. (Helena & Livingston S. & R. Co. v.
Lynch, 25 Mont. 497; 65 Pac. 919; Griffin v. Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 67 Mont. 386; 216 Pac.
765; Liston v. Reynolds, above.)"
The fact that jurors were actuated by passion and prejudice
are not the only basis for a new trial or a review of the amount
of damages awarded. If there has been a mistake as to law or
fact we find the courts reviewing the excessiveness of damages
as such. It is true that where a verdict is excessive, that alone,
is not made a statutory ground for a new trial;' however, this
problem as to the excessiveness of damages may be raised under
the specification that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
verdict." While the circuit courts of appeals generally state
there is no authority to review "excessiveness as such," the
fourth and the ninth circuits do claim such authority to a limited
degree."' Two relatively recent and very interesting cases which
clearly recognize the power of the ninth circuit to review "excessiveness as such" are Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie" and
Covey Gas & Oil Co. v. Checketts."
It is worthy of notation that in Southern Pacific v. Guthrie'
the court referred to Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R.' a
U.S.S.C. case, as implying the power in the circuit courts of having authority to review "excessiveness as such."
"69 Mont. 529; 223 Pac. 514.
"Kelley v. Daily Co., 56 Mont. 63; 181 Pac. 326.
"eBull v. Butte Electric By. Co., 69 Mont. 529; 223 Pac. 514.
"Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance,p. 233.
"186 F. (2d) 926 (9th Cir. 1951) cert. denied; 341 U. S. 904 (1951).
"187 F. (2d) 561 (9th Cir. 1951).
'Hupra, footnote 48.

n339 U.S. 96, (1950).
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This brings us very logically to the problem of just what, in
the opinion of the court, constitutes an excessive verdict, that is
a verdict so large that remittitur must be applied. To adequately
illustrate the extremely difficult problem which is presented in
the attempted formulation of a test or a guide as to just what
constitutes excessiveness in the eyes of the court, we shall examine
more thoroughly the two recent ninth circuit cases previously
referred to as well as Affolder v. New York, C. & St. L. R.A.'
The Affolder case involved a personal injury suit in which
the jury awarded the plaintiff $95,000.'
The trial judge saw fit
to reduce this amount to $89,000 after consideration of similar
cases and the remittitur was made. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court via the Court of Appeals' the court stated: "We agree
with the Court of Appeals that the amount of damages awarded
by the District Court's judgments is not monstrous. . .. "'
Thus, it appears that a verdict which is awarded by the
jury in a personal injury suit will be reduced by the Supreme
Court when it appears to be "monstrous," and, as we noted previously, this Affolder case has been construed as implying the
power in the circuit courts to review "excessiveness as such" in
personal injury cases.'
In the case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Guthrie,' circuit Judge
Pope, speaking for the majority of the court which was sitting
in bank, decided that the word "monstrous" as used by the
Supreme Court means "grossly excessive" and they refused to
order remittitur. In this case a verdict of $100,000 had been
awarded to the plaintiff. The court of appeals was of the opinion that no more than $60;000 of this was attributable to loss of
earnings. This left $40,000 for pain and suffering. The verdict
was "too high" stated the court, but $40,000 for intangibles is
not "grossly excessive," thus, no remittitur was ordered. There
were three dissents in this case. Chief Justice Denman seems
to apply a test that if the amount awarded is "substantially"
more than the appellant should pay, it is a denial of justice to
make him pay more than he admittedly "owes. "
Circuit Judge Stephens ® in his dissent rejects the so-called
2Supra, footnote 48, 49.
"339 U. S. 96, op. cit.
"79 F. Supp. 365 (E.D. Mo. 1948).
52New York, C. d St. L. R.R. v. A/folder, VOD F. ABdQ DuFr,
1949).
339 U. S. 96, 101, op. cit.
"Supra, footnote 48.

DT

ARcth

ir.

OSupra, footnote 48.

186 F. (2) 926, 933.

-186 F. (2) 926, 934.
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"monstrous" doctrine and points out that these cases must be
viewed from the standpoint of compensation and not from the
standpoint of punishment or resentment against the defendant or
from sympathy for the plaintiff. Furthermore, he states that he
cannot believe that our system of jurisprudence places everybody's material fortune, such as our free enterprise enables us to
accumulate, at the unbridled whim of any twelve men and women
no matter how good and true they may be. There must be some
basis for estimating the sum of money which one causing an injury must be compelled to pay to put the injured party in as
good a fortune as he could be expected to be in had he not suffered the injury, plus, of course, a generous sum for pain and
suffering. Judge Stephens concludes by pointing out that no
injured person has the right to go into court for sympathy money,
and that in the case at hand no more than a sixty or seventy
thousand dollar award would be reasonable.
In 1951, just a year after the decision in the Guthrie case, a
division of the ninth circuit held that a verdict of $35,000 for the
death of an eight year old son was "monstrous," and ordered a
remittitur of $15,000.'
From these two recent ninth circuit decisions two very important factors emerge. Namely, that at present there would appear to be little, if any, uniformity or standardization in the appellate court's treatment of personal injury verdicts and that,
even though there may be no absolute or certain basis upon which
our appellate judges may exercise their control, they are able to
introduce considerable uniformity in personal injury awards if
they are willing to assume this obligation.
More numerous are the writers who contend that the law
grows ever more hospitable to insurability in lieu of fault as the
premise of liability for personal injury.' Mr. Ehrenzweig has
collected much of the literature on this subject in his book Negligence Without Fault. As is pointed out by Jeffe :
"The basic fact is the pervasive and systematic use of
machinery. The consequence is high productivity and
vast markets. These in turn have given rise to a concept
of measurable risk and an ability to set aside part of the
product to insure the risk. Judges no longer fear to accept this view, if not always overtly, as the major
premise of the administration of the traditional concepts. But this creates certain contraditions which are
6

'Covey Ga8 d Oil Co. v. Jhekett8, 187 F. (2) 561.
"Supra, footnote 47, p. 219.
S08upr, footnote 47.
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only dimly felt or deliberately ignored. These seem to
me to be particularly acute in the field of damages."
The contention has been advanced that the traditional negligence principle should be rejected where insurance is available,
that is, where the subject matter or industry is susceptible to insurability. In other words, the insurance carrier would as a matter of course make payment for an injury and the negligenece
principle would not be involved. Of course where non-insurable
risks are involved the negligence principle would be retained.'
Some writers contend that a possible solution to this problem of ever increasing verdicts and unreasonable discrepancies
in personal injury actions may be a plan of a statutory insurance
scheme, similar to workmen's compensation or as Frank Grad
has pointed out, a plan similar to the Saskatchewan auto accident
compensation scheme.' Were any such plan to become an acceptable canon of tort law, it is apparent that more control over
jury verdicts would have to be exercised by our judges and considerable more predictability as to the amount of damages awarded by a jury would have to be forthcoming before any reasonable
basis could be developed for computation of premiums by an insurer.
Lastly, we consider the award which is clearly inadequate.
It would appear that a new trial may be ordered unless the defendant consents to a judgment in an amount considered to be
adequate." In 1935, however, the supreme court of the United
States held that the judge may not properly suggest, as an alternative to a new trial for inadequacy, that the defendant consent
to a judgment for an amount named, higher than the jury's
award. This was considered to be in violation of the 7th Amendment.' This convenient practice would therefore no longer be
available for the federal courts.
In Osterhoinv. Butte Electric By. Co.' we find this problem
arising for the first time in Montana (p. 203):
"That a judgment may be reversed and a new trial
ordered, where the damages awarded are clearly inadequate under the evidence, has been many times affirmed
by this and other courts; that this court never has as"Supra, footnote 47, p. 237.
"Grad, Recent Development in Automobile Aceident Compensation, 50
Col. L. Rev. 300 (1950).
"Supra, footnote 41.
67Dimiek v. Schmeidt, 293 U. S. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296, 95 A. L. R. 1150, (1935);
Cooley Cas. Damages (2d ed.) p. 14 (four justices dissenting.)
"60 Mont. 193; 199 Pac. 252.
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sumed to exercise the authority to power of 'scaling a
verdict upward.' "
The court does not find it necessary to decide the problem of
the court's power of incresciturin this case, however. In Coombes
v. Letcher,' which was a suit over personal injuries where a new
trial was granted because of an inadequate verdict, Mr. Justice
Stewart and Mr. Justice Morris appear to recognize the power of
the court to increase an inadequate verdict in a personal injury
case. A special concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Angstman,
in which Chief Justice Sands, and Associate Justice Anderson
agree, states:
"... I am not to be understood as subscribing to the view
that it is ever proper for the court in personal injury
cases to increase an award for damages. I think our only
right in such a case is to send the case back for a new
trial, before the jury, as we are doing here."
From these two cases it would appear that in a personal injury case in which an alleged inadequate verdict had been rendered, increscitur would not be available as a remedy in Montana.
There are other useful expedients for the lessening of effort
and expense upon a retrial. One of these would be to place
a restriction upon the order for a new trial, limiting the new hearing to the issue of the amount of damages, and leaving undisturbed the finding of liability.
The discussion in this comment is not intended to be a complete discussion of all of the powers of the judge as regards directing verdicts, but only an attempt to point out to what extent
this power may be exercised should the judge so choose.
HOWARD W. HEBERT
*104 Mont. 371; 66 P. (2d) 769.
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